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Introduction 
According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2012-13, the 
United States now ranks as 14th in the world in terms of the quality of its infrastructure. Further, 
alarm bells are going off at the local level based on the outlook of future financial requirements 
for the maintenance of existing infrastructure. With large levels of debt at the city level which 
constrain the ability of municipal governments to finance capital spending, it is becoming even 
more difficult to reverse the erosion of capital and consequently, economic competitiveness. 
This study applies tested methods of researchers like Fisher (2013), Temple (1994) and 
Poterba (1995) in analyzing the determinants of capital spending. However, I break away from 
the norm of looking at spending at higher levels of government, and take a step down the lower 
level of the city government to see how capital spending might be determined. This is where the 
action is, and where there is a rising need to undertake research in the area of public finance. 
More explicitly, the research question that I pose to myself is: “What are the major 
determinants of public capital spending at the city level?” 
To answer this question, I employ a median voter demand model to analyze the factors 
that contribute to changes in the demand for municipal capital spending. The primary variables 
or factors of interest are median income and the tax price. However, also of critical importance 
especially for local governments are contributing factors such as existing debt levels, the revenue 
base of the city and the political ideology of its residents – who demand capital spending in the 
first place.  
We find that tax price, total revenue per capita, political ideology and population levels 
have a direct, statistically significant impact on the demand for public capital spending at the city 
level. However, the study is constrained by a variety of limitations including but not limited to a 
low sample size and a weak analysis of the lagged effects of variables. Future studies should be 
cognizant of these constraints and aim to correct for these weaknesses in order to get to more 
reliable estimates for the impact of different independent variables on overall municipal public 
capital spending in the United States. 
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The first section of this study provides a brief review of existing literature in the field of 
capital spending, with a focus on its links with economic growth (which is why this study is 
relevant) and on its determinants (the focus of this study). I construct a median voter demand 
model in the second section, which lays down the foundations for further analysis of the 
determinants of public capital spending at the local level. In the third section, I discuss the 
universal set of variables in my dataset, together with their sources. Further, I use section three 
plus the appendix to provide my initial hypotheses on the independent variables for the analysis. 
The fourth section provides details on the methodology of my econometric analysis on my 
dataset. The three core models include simple ordinary least squares regression, two-way fixed 
effects estimation and first differencing. This section also includes information on the models 
and specifications used for the sensitivity analysis. I discuss the findings of my analysis in the 
fifth section. The last two sections provide a conclusion to the study and a way forward for future 
research.  
Background 
 
With more than half of the world’s population living in urban areas which cover a little 
over 2% of the planet’s land cover, managing urban infrastructure has emerged as one of the 
major challenges of the 21st century. A rapid inflow of individuals seeking a higher quality of 
life, higher incomes and more networked living, the strain on infrastructures in cities demands 
urgent attention. Within a city, infrastructure’s significance to an economy is realized in multiple 
ways. First and foremost, it bolsters and maintains economic competitiveness, leading to a higher 
standard of living for a country’s inhabitants and a better quality of life. While increased growth 
achieved through improved economic competitiveness leads to better payoffs for workers, 
infrastructure also upgrades the standard of life in and of itself.  
The economic downturn of 2001 as well as the financial burden of the War on Terror and 
the ‘Great Recession’ of 2008 has financially destabilized the United States. This has happened 
at exactly at a time when robust economic growth was necessary to provide financial support to 
the deteriorating infrastructure in the urban centers. As a result, the USA is now ranked 14th in 
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the world in terms of infrastructure, as compared to 7th in 20081. Furthermore, the American 
Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) has downgraded the infrastructure status of the country to a 
D+, citing a lack of planned funding and inadequate maintenance2.  
The investments of the previous generation produced the highways, roads, railway tracks, 
neighborhoods and water and sewage lines that are utilized routinely. While it is clear that 
establishing this infrastructure required large investments, what is less understood is that the 
maintenance of this capital stock can be as expensive as creating it. The ASCE estimates that the 
country needs to inject US$ 3.6 trillion into the infrastructure sector by 2020 to maintain 
economic competitiveness. If the United States is unable to support its competitiveness, the 
current financial instability might turn out to be a telling blow to the country’s trading position in 
the world, leading to a direct impact on its export sector on the one hand which affects job 
creation at home, as well as the quality of life at home for its citizens, both due to a lack of direct 
investment in infrastructure and through the deterioration of their net payoffs within the national 
economy. The existing capital stock is in urgent need of revitalization, and demands for new 
infrastructure have skyrocketed to meet the basic needs of growing populations. 
The federal government certainly has a role to play, as signified as the crucial Stimulus 
package of 2009. However, Washington DC has been stuck in a perpetual state of gridlock in 
recent years. Combined with the financial constraints of the last decade, this political malaise at 
the federal level is forcing local governments to take matters into their own hands. The nation’s 
top 100 metropolitan areas sit on only 12% of the country’s land mass, but are home to two-
thirds of the population and generate 75% of the GDP. Urban areas dominate because they 
embody “concentration and agglomeration – networks of innovative firms, talented workers, 
risk-taking entrepreneurs and supportive institutions and associations that cluster together in 
urban areas and coproduce economic progress”3. However, cities are where the debilitation of 
infrastructure will be the fastest, given the high population densities and rising, unprecedented 
demands on urban infrastructure. Further, capital spending by central cities dominates 
metropolitan spending every year. Evidence suggests that at least as far as local capital spending 
1 World Economic Forum, “Global Competitiveness Report 2012-13” , 2013, 
<http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2012-13.pdf> 
2 American Society of Civil Engineers, “Infrastructure Report Card”, 2013, 
<http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/> 
3 Katz, B., Jennifer, Bradley, “The Metropolitan Revolution”, Brookings Institution, 2013. 
5 | P a g e  
 
                                                          
is concerned, central city residents spend more than suburbanites in the metropolitan area. In line 
with this trend, a majority of the funds generated are spent in the central city as compared to the 
suburban areas of the metro4.  
This research is moving into uncharted territories. Almost all existing research deals with 
state, metropolitan or combined local government finance, without a specific focus on cities. The 
lowest unit of study that I have seen being used up until now in cross-sectional studies is the 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), which a city might or might not be exclusively bounded 
by. One of the reasons is that while comprehensive, annual data on city finances exists, it is 
found in every city’s unique Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFR). Consolidating 
this data is both time consuming and costly. However, it could also be the case that the 
significance of cities specifically within state and local public finance is only now becoming 
obvious, in the context of urban growth and with a world reeling with the effects of the 
recession. Given the increased burden on city-level finances, more research might emerge on this 
topic.  
Literature Review 
 
One of the most important functions of local government is to construct and maintain 
public works infrastructure in their jurisdiction. These capital investments result in infrastructure 
which includes bridges, streets, sewer lines and water mains among others. It has been argued 
that residential and commercial actors depend on this infrastructure for their physical well-being 
and economic prosperity5. However, the debate about how much of an impact this infrastructure 
has on the economic growth of a particular community has raged on in the academia 
periodically. 
 
 
4 Haughwoot, A. F. “Local capital spending in us metropolitan areas”. Woodrow Wilson School of Public and 
International Affairs. 
5 Wendorf, Jill (2005) "Capital Budgeting from a Local Government Perspective," SPNA Review: Vol. 1: Iss. 1, Article 
6. <http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/spnareview/vol1/iss1/6> 
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Relationship between Public Capital Spending and Economic Growth 
 
The work of Choate and Walter (1981) and Vaughan (1983) rang the alarm bells in the 
United States, in the perspective of deteriorating capital and insufficient levels of infrastructure 
financing in the country6. Following a brief lull, many prominent studies on the impact of capital 
spending on economic growth were undertaken in the early 1990s, including by Bartik (1991), 
Wasylenko (1991), Munnell (1992) and Fox and Murray (1993). While past researchers have 
used multiple measures for capital spending – aggregated as total state capital outlay, or 
disaggregated by sector – studies which have used spending on transportation and highway 
facilities produce the most significant results7. Even within this measure, those studies that use a 
physical measure of such facilities produce significant results more often, as compared to studies 
which use direct highway spending to assess the impact on economic growth. The only study 
which suggests that such spending has a negative and significant impact on development is 
Dalenberg and Patridge (1995).  
Another way of looking at the impact of infrastructure on economic growth was to look 
at the potential relationship between infrastructure stock and national factor productivity and the 
resulting economic growth. Some of the critical works in this area include those by Aschauer 
(1989), Munnell (1990) and Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1992). Aschauer showed that public 
capital and private capital are complementary in improving economic growth. Alicia Munnell 
showed the complementarity between labor and public capital. Garcia-Mila and McGuire found 
that in addition to labor and private capital, highway as well as education spending also 
contribute to bolstering economic growth. 
However, studies later in the decade tried to counter this earlier deluge of studies that 
suggested strong linkages between public capital and economic growth. One of the reasons for 
the consolidated response to these studies was their controversial nature, especially with regards 
to the methods used. Holtz-Eakin (1994), Evans and Karras (1994) and Garcia-Mila, McGuire 
and Porter (1996) suggested that results formulated early on in the decade were biased, since 
6 Hefner, F. L., & Burson, T. E. (1990, NOV). “The determinants of regional infrastructure spending”. 37th Annual 
North American Regional science meetings, Boston, MA. 
7 Fisher, R. C. (1997). The Effects of State and local public services on economic development”. New England 
Economic Review, 1997. 
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they did not control for time or area-specific effects which had a correlation with public capital – 
leading to endogeneity and as suggested, bias in the results. Once these effects were controlled 
for, smaller or zero returns to additional marginal investment in public capital were found8. 
Determinants of Public Capital Spending 
 
While much has been said about the impact of public capital spending on economic 
growth, there is a real dearth of research – especially in recent years – on the issue. Poterba 
(1995)9 dealt with the determinants of capital spending, which also affect interstate differentials, 
including those in the use of debts to fund that spending; as well as on the effect of fiscal rules 
and procedures on capital spending. Temple (1994)10 also looked at the issue of public capital 
spending and the factors of this spending. I have to emphasize here that that most studies that 
were reviewed dealt with spending at the state level, while some dealt with the metropolitan area, 
or considered all local governments. No studies were found that specifically dealt with capital 
spending at the city level in a panel setting. Hefner and Burson dealt with the determinants of 
public capital spending at the regional level11. Fisher and Wassmer (2013) undertook a study the 
determinants of public capital spending at the state level, adapting the models of capital spending 
developed by Poterba (1995) and Temple (1994). I will also be using a variation of this model in 
the next section. It must be noted that there are studies which deal with trends in public capital 
spending in individual cities including Philadelphia, New York City and Boston, but again, none 
of these compares these trends with other cities to determine the causes of public capital 
spending. Thus, this research aims to continue research into the determinants of public capital 
spending and also, fill the gap in research at the city level. Given the rising importance of cities, 
this research provides important insights that might not have been provided by prior research into 
capital spending which dealt with higher subnational units of government. 
8 Fisher, R. C. (1997). “The effects of state and local public services on economic development”. New England 
Economic Review, 1997. 
9 Poterba, James M., 1995. "Capital budgets, borrowing rules, and state capital spending," Journal of Public 
Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 165-187, February. 
10 Temple, Judy. 1994. “The debt/tax choice in the financing of state and local capital expenditures”, Journal 
of Regional Science, vol. 34, pp. 529-547. 
11 Hefner, F. L., & Burson, T. E. (1990, NOV). “The determinants of regional infrastructure spending”. 37th annual 
North American regional science meetings, Boston, MA. 
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The model in the following section has been adapted from multiple models found in the 
literature, including those by Temple (1994), Poterba (1995), Fisher (2007) and Fisher and 
Wassmer (2013). However, most of these models were constructed using covariates relevant for 
state level analyses. Therefore, major overhauling was required.  
Median Voter Demand Model for Public Capital Spending 
 
I borrowed from previous modeling done in the area of public spending, primarily by 
Fisher (2007, Chapter 4), Temple (1994) and Poterba (1995). Temple and Poterba specifically 
focused on capital spending. However, previous models have focused on the state level. The city 
level presents large variations from the state level: in tax structures (higher reliance on property 
taxes as compared to the state level); the structure of capital stock (concentrated capital at the 
city level as compared to the state level); and in political structures. Therefore, a one-to-one 
adaptation was not feasible. Therefore, I have retained the core components of the demand model 
for public spending, but made important variations that capture these differences between the 
city and the state level.  
However, what are the characteristics of the voter that I base my consumer demand 
model on? In order to answer the question of this consumer is at the city level, I drew on existing 
literature and made the assumption that the median voter wins the vote in favor of his or her 
choice each time and is therefore, the decisive voter and consumer. Borrowing from Fisher 
(2007, chapter 3), the median-voter theorem states that: 
“If voters’ preferences are single-peaked, if the choice to be made by voting is represented along 
a single continuum, if all alternatives are voted on, and if voters act in their true preferences, then 
the choice selected by majority vote is the median of the desired outcomes.” 
By preferences being single-peaked, I mean that each voter in the city has a clearly 
preferred alternative and continually gets less satisfaction as he or she moves away from that 
alternative in either direction. Further, the choice to be made must be linear on a single 
continuum, implying that for example, there should be increase or decrease in capital spending in 
one direction, without varying chunks of capital spending put up to vote. This scenario can be 
illustrated by a simple example. Suppose that voter A has preference for capital spending level 
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Ea, voter B has preference for capital spending level Eb and voter C has preference for capital 
spending level Ec, where Ec>Eb>Ea. If the government wants to select between Ea and Eb, then 
voter A will vote for Ea and voter B will vote for Eb. Given that voter C desires the highest level 
of capital spending of Ec, he or she will prefer Eb or Ea, which will give it greater utility. The 
same logic applies if the government was choosing between Eb and Ec, where voter A would 
also vote for Eb since he or she prefers a lower level of capital spending. In either case, the 
median voter, voter B emerges with the winner and the highest level of utility.  
However, does the median voter also have the median income? This question is important 
since the median voter demand model for capital spending takes into account the ‘median 
income’, with the assumption being made that the median income is earned by the median voter. 
Based on the work of Theodore Bergstrom and Robert Goodman, this will be true if the desired 
expenditure increases (decreases) with income, and this increase (decrease) in the desired 
expenditure is higher (lower) than the increase (decrease) in the tax price that a higher (lower) 
income leads to. If this condition fails and income elasticity of desired expenditure is U-shaped, 
than the median voter will not have the median income. However, following existing literature 
which employs this assumption generously, I will also assume that at the city level in the United 
States, the median income is earned by the median voter with slight – but negligible – variations. 
Therefore, the public sector demand model will use the median voter’s preferences as its core 
characteristic.  
The first thing that a median voter demand model for capital spending requires is an 
illustration of the median voter’s preferences. These are captured by the following utility 
function: 
U = U(X, G, S) 
where, 
X=private consumption 
G=Public services 
S=Stabilization fund or account balances 
The level of public service provided to the median voter depends on current public spending, the 
public capital stock and population. Thus, 
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G=f(Ec, K, P), 
where, 
Ep=Current public expenditure 
K=Public capital stock 
P=Population 
Thus, the utility function simplifies to: 
U=U(X, Ep, K, P, S) 
The public capital stock equals: 
K=Kt-1*(1-d) + Ek 
where, 
d=public capital depreciation 
Ek=capital expenditure 
The utility function further simplifies to: 
U=(X, Ep, Kt-1*(1-d), Ek, P, S) 
Having defined the median voter’s utility function, I would not define the median voter’s budget 
constraint. His or her budget constraint is: 
Y=X + t*T 
where, 
t=median voter’s tax price or share, 
T=current tax collections 
Y=income for the median voter 
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The tax price or tax share of the median voter (t) can be defined in multiple ways. Given that I 
am dealing with city level finances where property taxes are the largest contributor to the city’s 
tax base, the price that the median voter has to pay for the taxes can be measured using relevant 
statistics on property data at the city level. Therefore, our proxy for the overall price for tax for 
the median voter is his or her share of the overall property market valuation at the city level. This 
methodology is consistent with Fisher (2007, chapter 4). Fisher states: 
t = Vm(1-S)/V 
where, 
t=tax price or tax share 
Vi= taxable property value of the median voter 
V=total taxable property value in the jurisdiction 
However, I make two changes to this formulation. The first is that instead of taking the taxable 
property value which could be construed as the ‘assessed’ valuation of the taxable property, I 
take the market valuations of property at the city level. It is important to make this explicit, since 
a higher assessment rate might be cancelled out by a lower property tax rate and vice versa. 
Market valuations would therefore, give a fair idea of what the contribution of the median voter 
is to the total property tax base at the city level. Moreover, we make the strong assumption that 
tax deductions and credits for property taxes are consistent at the city level across the United 
States. Therefore, the tax price now becomes: 
t=Vm/V 
Thus, the median voter’s budget constraint becomes: 
Y=X+(Vm/V)*T 
While it would be possible to attempt to maximize the median voter’s utility (maxU) subject to 
this budget constraint (X+(Vm/V)*T – Y=0), it is important to understand what comprises the 
tax (T) or revenue for the government. Assuming a balanced budget, the government’s budget 
constraint is: 
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Ep + Ek + r*Dt-1+Es = T + I + B 
where, 
Ep: Current public expenditure 
Ek=capital expenditure 
r=interest rate on outstanding debt 
Dt-1=outstanding debt 
Es=allocation to the stabilization fund or balances, 
T=Tax revenues 
I=intergovernmental revenue 
B=borrowing 
Since taxation and borrowing are the primary tools for financing capital expenditure, Ek is 
financed both by T and by B. Thus, part of the capital expenditure is financed by taxation and 
part of it is financed by borrowing. The share of capital expenditure financed by borrowing is: 
B=b*Ek 
where, 
b=debt share of current capital expenditure 
Building on the evidence provided by Temple (1994) and using the same assumption used by 
Fisher & Wassmer (2013), we assume that the debt share of capital spending (b) is independent 
of the level of capital spending (Ek). Therefore, the government’s budget constraint simplifies to: 
Ep + Ek + r*Dt-1+Es = T + I + b*Ek; or 
T=Ep + Ek + r*Dt-1 + Es – I – b*Ek 
Going back to the median voter’s budget constraint, I had: 
X+(Vm/V)*T-Y=0 
Combining the median voter’s budget constraint and the government’s budget constraint 
(substituting the expression for T in the individual’s budget constraint), I arrive at: 
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X+(Vm/V)*( Ep + Ek + r*Dt-1 + Es – I – b*Ek) – Y=0 
Remember that the median voter’s utility function is defined as: 
U=(X, Ep, Kt-1*(1-d), Ek, P, S) 
Therefore, all that needs to be done is to maximize the median voter’s utility function, subject to 
his or her budget constraint. Therefore, 
Maximize U=(X, Ep, Kt-1*(1-d), Ek, P, S) 
subject to X+(Vm/V)*( Ep + Ek + r*Dt-1 + Es – I – b*Ek) – Y=0 
This implies that the median voter desires to consume whatever quantities of private 
consumption (X), public capital expenditure (Ek) and public current expenditure (Ep) that give 
the median voter the highest happiness – or utility – from the range that can be afforded, given 
his or her budget constraint. Therefore, the median voter’s demand for public capital spending 
(Ek) depends on private income (Y), overall population in the city (P), stabilization funds (S), 
existing net public stock [Kt-1*(1-d)], the median voter’s tax share (t), interest on debt (r), the 
outstanding city-level debts (Dt-1), intergovernmental revenue (I) and institutional fiscal 
constraints as well as the characteristics affecting preferences (nature of the utility function). 
These additional preferences and other institutional and environmental factors affecting the 
model are defined in the following section. 
Dataset, Variables and Hypotheses 
Sample Size 
 
Data for this analysis covers three years: 2006, 2009 and 2012. There are two primary 
reasons for selecting these three years. Firstly, there was a risk that year to year changes in 
different variables might not be large enough to produce sufficient variation for obtaining 
statistically significant results from an econometric analysis on the data. Therefore, spacing out 
years allowed for larger potential changes to be observed. Secondly, given the impact of the 
recession in 2008-09, the year 2006 can be seen as the year containing observations prior to the 
recession, 2009 being affected directly by the recession and 2012 being the post-recession time 
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period. This makes our analysis richer, and controlling for appropriate covariates and time 
dummies, we can make inferences on the impact that the recession had on public capital 
spending at the local level. However, it must be noted that there is the possibility that the 
determinants of public capital spending between 2006 and 2009 were different as compared to 
the determinants of similar spending between 2009 and 12. However, analyzing this 
heterogeneity of determinants is beyond the scope of this study. 
The selection of cities for the study was slightly more arbitrary. I selected 100 cities, 
based on 3 rounds of selection. I used total population size as the primary characteristic of 
selecting cities in the first round, when the 50 largest cities in the United States were selected. 
This provided a sample which represented 28 states of the total 50, as well as Washington DC, 
the federal district in the United States. The second round of selection was based on providing 
representation to the remaining 22 states. The biggest cities in each state were selected. The 
remaining 28 cities (100-50-22) were selected through randomization in round 3. However, it 
was ensured that all cities selected had populations greater than 60,000. Thus, the selection 
process aimed to strike a balance both in terms of city size as well as geographical 
representation. With three years of data (2006, 2009 and 2012) and 100 cities, my raw dataset 
included 300 observations. However, since the construction of the dataset relied on multiple 
sources, some of which provided insufficient data, a number of observations were lost in the 
cleaning of the dataset prior to analysis. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1 in the 
appendix to this paper. All data has been adjusted for inflation using GDP deflators with 2009 as 
the base year. 
The next sub-section lists both the dependent variables and the independent variables 
considered in this analysis. Not all of these variables were part of every model specification. All 
monetary data besides median income is in per capita, inflation-adjusted terms 
Dependent Variable: 
 
1. Capital outlay per capita (referred to, interchangeably, as capital spending per capita) 
Independent Variables: 
1. Median income  
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2. Tax price 
3. Real GDP per capita 
4. Total revenue per capita 
5. Tax per capita 
6. Median age of structure 
7. Net capital assets per capita 
8. Outstanding debt per capita 
9. Credit ratings 
10. Population 
11. Median age 
12. Unemployment rate 
13. Political ideology 
14. ARRA 
15. Time dummies 
16. City dummies 
17. No debt limit dummy 
Detailed information on the description of this data, their sources, the hypotheses for all the 
impact of all the independent variables on capital spending per capita and the explanation of 
these hypotheses are provided in Table 2 in the appendix 
Methodology 
 
For analyzing my dataset, I had a range of options to pick from. The basic model that I 
use is an ordinary least squares regression, controlling for different sets of covariates. However, 
given that there might be time invariant heterogeneity and common unobserved effects across 
cities, I also use a two-way fixed effects estimator. It would also be interesting to see how much 
the rate of change in capital expenditure is altered across time, controlling for different 
covariates, for which I utilized a first differenced model. 
Pooled OLS regression 
 
The basic Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) model provides us with a foundational 
understanding of the impact of different covariates including tax price and the income of the 
median voter on the demand for capital spending at the city level. It is specified as follows: 
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𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 + �𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
The assumption that I make for the POLS model is that there are no common unobserved 
trends across cities (nothing structurally different happens in all cities at the same time for a 
particular year) and that there is no unobserved heterogeneity across cities (cities do not have 
unique unobserved characteristics that might affect their demand for capital spending). These 
assumptions are hard to defend, since there must have been a time-specific change in the demand 
for capital spending during the recession of 2008-09, reflected in our data for 2009. Further, 
cities might have had unique unobserved heterogeneity which affected the demand for capital 
spending by median voters in these cities. These could range from the belief of individuals in the 
role of government (which I have tried to partially capture with the political ideology variable), 
to general belief in the importance of capital spending in advancing the socioeconomic condition 
of a city.  
If the time-invariant or common trends error term is correlated with the covariates in my 
model, then omitted variable bias would be introduced into the analysis. Therefore, the POLS 
will have to make the strong assumption that even if these effects exist, they are not correlated 
with the covariates in the analysis. However, this might not be true since a median voter’s beliefs 
about the role of government might affect both the demand for public capital spending, as well as 
the desire for more or less public debt to be incurred. 
While these two factors can bias our estimates for the POLS model, it gives us a good 
foundation to start off with, especially in noting the direction of the impact of different variables 
on the demand for capital spending at the city level. Further, and more importantly, it enriches 
our understanding of these two effects, since by utilizing a model that controls for them, we can 
compare this new model and the POLS model and see how the impact of different variables on 
demand for capital spending changed.  
Two-way fixed effects estimator 
 
The two-way fixed effects estimator does not make the assumption of unobserved 
common trends or unobserved heterogeneity across cities. Instead, it takes into account the 
possibility that these two effects exist and are captured by the error term in my model, and that 
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these effects (and thus, the error term) are correlated with the observable variables in my model. 
Thus, it controls for these effects by generating dummies for cities and time periods (one dummy 
is of course omitted, in order to avoid the ‘dummy variable trap’ or the issue of perfect 
multicollinearity). These dummies allow us to control for the effect of common, time-specific 
trends as well as time-invariant unobserved characteristics of cities. However, I do assume strict 
exogeneity in my analysis. Otherwise, even a two-way fixed effects model might not be tenable. 
What this implies is that the present error term has a mean of zero, conditional on past, present 
and future values of the regressors. Thus, we assume that the two unobserved effects are not 
related to independent variables such as income, tax price or outstanding debt. In fact, this 
assumption must hold for our entire analysis if it is to produce consistent results. 
The fixed effects estimator, also known as the within estimator is specified for my model 
as follows: 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + �𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡  + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 
Where 𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡  + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 (𝜈𝑖𝑡 is independent and identically distributed) 
The time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity is captured by 𝛼𝑖 , while the common 
unobserved trends are captured by 𝛾𝑡. The within estimator demeans the data, that is, it subtracts 
the respective mean values from the dependent variables, the independent variables and the error 
term. Thus, this sweeps away the effects of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Further, the 
common unobserved effects are captured by time dummies in this model. Under the assumptions 
made in this section, the two-way fixed effects estimator should give us unbiased estimates of the 
parameters on our independent variables. 
Between Estimator 
The model is as follows: 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝚤𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝚤𝑛𝑔�����������������������𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑑𝚤𝑎𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒���������������������𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑟𝚤𝑐𝑒�������������𝑖 + �𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖  + 𝑢𝑡 
Where 𝜇𝑖𝑡 is independent and identically distributed) 
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While two-way fixed effects estimation provides us with key insights into variation 
within cities across time, we would also like to analyze the differentials in variation across cities. 
For this, the between estimator is used. The between estimator averages out variables across 
times and runs a pooled OLS on the cross-section of averages across cities, allowing us to see the 
how the impact of different variables affect public capital spending at the municipal level across 
cities. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
While my core models are intended to provide key insights into the determinants of 
public capital spending at the municipal level, I want to run a sensitivity analysis to see how 
variations in my models would alter these impacts. One reason would be to see the robustness of 
my results across different models, but also to tease out why – if any – changes are emerging 
from the use of different models. Another reason is to see if anything new could be learnt from 
analyzing the dataset.  
First-difference estimator 
 
While level changes give us critical information about the impact of different covariates 
on capital spending at the city level, I wanted to see the impact of these variables on the rate of 
change of capital spending over the period of our study. Essentially, I wanted to see how much 
of a change the change in one variable had, on the rate of change on capital spending. Therefore, 
a first-differences estimator was also used. The same assumptions of strict exogeneity and the 
assumption that the error term is independent and identically distributed are made in this model. 
 The first-differences estimator exploits the special features of panel data to measure the 
association between time-invariant one-period changes in regressors and time-invariant one-
period changes in the dependent variable12. I start with the fixed effects model and lag it by one 
year: 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + �𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡−1  + 𝜈𝑖,𝑡−1 
12 Cameron A. C. & Trivedi P. K., "Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications," Chapter 21, Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2005. 
19 | P a g e  
 
                                                          
Then, I subtract this lagged equation from the original fixed effects model to get: 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 −
𝛽2𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 − ∑𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛾𝑡 − 𝛾𝑡−1+𝜈𝑖𝑡 − 𝜈𝑖,𝑡−1 
Or 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + �𝛽∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡  + 𝜈𝑖,𝑡 
Where 𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑡  + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 (𝜈𝑖𝑡 is independent and identically distributed) 
Like the fixed effects estimator, the first-differences estimator yields consistent estimates 
of the parameters. This is because time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity is subtracted out, 
while the common unobserved trends are controlled with the use of time dummies. However, the 
major weakness of this model is that the parameters on time-invariant covariates are not 
identified. Further, it is less efficient than the fixed effects model if T>2, which is true in our 
case where T=3 (2006, 2009, 2012), where T is the number of time periods considered. 
Furthermore, the lagged effect of variables is much more difficult to gauge with the first-
differences estimator. For example, while I might be looking at the rate of change of capital 
spending between 2006-09 while controlling for the rate of change of outstanding debt at the 
same time, it can be argued that the rate of change in outstanding debt in prior periods is what 
defines the rate of change of capital spending in the time period 2006-09. However, while the 
core model just looks for rates of change in the same period, I try to minimize this weakness in 
the model in the sensitivity analysis, where level variables are also considered. This implies that 
the rate of change in capital spending is estimated, controlling for the initial or base values of 
different covariates at the beginning of the time period 
First-differenced dependent variables with level independent variables 
As discussed in the analysis of the first-difference estimator, there are issues with 
determining causality while looking at the impact of a change in one variable on the change in 
another variable. This may be because the change in the dependent variable might actually have 
been determined by the level of the independent variable at the start of the period during which 
the change is being assessed, or by changes in the prior period. While not discounting the fact 
that changes in the independent variable might also have an effect on changes in the dependent 
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variable in a common time period, base values of independent variables can provide useful 
information the determinants of the rate of change of the dependent variable – public capital 
spending at the municipal level. Therefore, for this sensitivity analysis, I constructed a model 
which has first differenced data for the dependent variable and independent variables, but also 
level (or base) values for the independent variable. So for example, if I am looking at the rate of 
change in public capital spending between 2006 and 2009, I used base values for 2006 for all 
independent variables. The model is illustrated below: 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + �𝛽∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡
+ �𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑡  + 𝜈𝑖,𝑡 
Where 𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑡  + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 (𝜈𝑖𝑡 is independent and identically distributed) 
The intuition here is that both changes in independent variables in a period, as well as 
base values of the independent variable at the beginning of the time period will have an impact 
on the change in capital spending during the same time period. 
Discussion of Results 
Pooled OLS 
The pooled OLS (POLS) provided interesting results. While the coefficient on median 
income was positive as hypothesized, it was not statistically significant. at the 95% confidence 
level. Similarly, the estimates on tax price are not statistically significant but are negative, as 
hypothesized. This regression suggests that median income and tax price do not have a 
statistically significant impact on public capital spending.  
Out of the range of environmental covariates included in the model, only outstanding 
debt per capita was statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. It suggests that a $1 
increase in debt increases capital spending by $0.08. This might be a reflection of cities taking 
debt to partially finance capital spending at the municipal level. However, what is significant is 
the magnitude which is low.  
Local share of capital spending as a share of state-local capital spending also has a 
statistically significant impact on capital spending at the 90% confidence level. A one percentage 
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point increase in this share increases capital spending at the local level by approximately $4, on 
average, ceteris paribus. Since we control for a host of other factors, this is not simply a 
reflection of greater spending at the local level. What this suggests that holding even total capital 
spending and total capital stock constant, cities which are more active in the public economy 
spend more on average on capital spending. Thus, our hypothesis is validated. This might be a 
reflection of the fact that cities which take more of a leadership role in a particular state also 
focus more on the capital needs of their economy.   
 A one dollar increase in total net capital stock per capita increases public capital spending 
by $0.013, on average, ceteris paribus. This suggests that cities which have larger existing 
infrastructure also spend more on that infrastructure. This is an interesting finding, since we 
would expect infrastructure spending to increase with lower existing capital stock because of the 
catch up effect. However, I would conjecture that it might be the case that a higher level of 
capital stock is indicative of momentum in capital spending and a higher prioritization of such 
spending at the city level. 
 
Fixed Effects Estimator 
While the POLS produced interesting results, I wanted to make sure that my estimates are 
not biased by unobserved heterogeneity across cities, or by unobserved common trends in the 
form of shocks generalizable across cities in a particular time period (such as the recession). The 
fixed effects estimator helped me sweep away these unobserved effects. However, the fixed 
effects estimator did not produce significant estimates for the impact of median income on 
capital spending. Conversely however, estimates for the tax price variable are significant at the 
99% confidence level for the two-way fixed effects estimator. For every percentage point 
increase in the share of the median voter in the total tax base of the city (the tax price), capital 
spending decreases by $6178.5 per capita. This is the hypothesized change. However, bear in 
mind that the tax price variable is essentially the fraction of total tax supported by the median 
voter: one individual. One would not expect an individual with the median income in a 
community to support more than a few thousands of the tax base, unless the population is 
extremely low. Since this is not the case, it must be kept in mind that the right scale will have to 
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be used for interpreting results on tax price. It might be better to say that for every 0.001 
percentage point increase in tax price, public capital spending per capita increases by $6.2 on 
average, ceteris paribus.  
Of the environmental variables in the model, an increase in outstanding debt per capita of 
one dollar increases capital spending by $0.0891. This result is significant at the 99% confidence 
level. This goes counter to my hypothesis that increasing debt hampers the ability of city 
governments to borrow for capital spending, leading to lower capital spending. The case might 
be that this is simply a reflection of governments borrowing to finance capital spending, with a 
simple correlation between the two variables. The effect of constrained borrowing on capital 
spending can better be captured by including a lagged debt variable to see the effect of past 
borrowing on current capital spending. However, this can also be captured by the dummy for low 
credit rating. However, this model suggests that the estimate for the impact of low credit rating 
on capital spending is not statistically significant. 
If the local share of capital spending as a share of state-local capital spending increases 
by one percentage point, public capital spending per capita increases by $2.2, on average, ceteris 
paribus. This result is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. The explanation for 
this result remains the same as for POLS. However, this estimate is almost half of what I got for 
POLS, indicating that unobserved heterogeneity might have been producing an upward bias in 
the estimate for POLS. The other variables show statistically insignificant impacts when we use 
the two-way fixed effects estimator.   
Between Estimator 
The between estimator produced interesting results. Firstly, while the hypothesized signs 
seem to be correct in the case of median income (positive) and tax price (negative), these 
estimates appear to be statistically insignificant. However, stimulus funding appears to have 
played a significant role in impacting public capital spending levels at the city level when we 
compare cities. For every one dollar increase in stimulus funding (solely for infrastructure), there 
is an increase of $1.067 in public capital spending per capita at the city level, on average, ceteris 
paribus. This result is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. This indicates that if a 
city got one dollar more than another – controlling for other variables – it increased public 
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capital spending by more than one dollar: public capital spending was stimulated. Thus, the 
between estimator suggests that the stimulus had the desired effect on capital spending at the city 
level.  
Outstanding debt per capita is once again estimated to produce a statistically significant 
impact on capital spending at the 99% confidence level. However, across cities, this impact is 
marginally lower than within cities across time. For a one dollar increase in outstanding debt per 
capita, public capital spending per capita increases by $0.06 (as compared to approximately 
$0.08-$0.09 within cities across time) on average, ceteris paribus. Thus, cities which took more 
debt spent more on capital spending. 
Net capital stock per capita appears to generate a positive impact on public capital 
spending at the 90% confidence level. Interestingly, the coefficient is the same as the pooled 
OLS: $0.0129. Thus, a one dollar increase in net capital stock per capita produces an increase in 
public capital spending per capita of $0.0129, on average, ceteris paribus. Thus, cities which 
have more capital stock also appear to have the momentum in public spending as well as the 
willingness to spend more. In a way, this raises a red flag for state and local governments. In the 
long run it might be the case that the disparity between infrastructure standings across cities will 
increase over time, with cities with better infrastructure now will have an even larger advantage 
against cities which do not have quality infrastructure currently, leading to further erosion of 
economic competitiveness of these cities. 
The results for the POLS, two-way fixed effects estimator and the between estimator are 
presented in Table 3: 
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Table 3: Results for Pooled OLS, Two-Way Fixed Effects Estimator and 
Between Estimator 
Variable Name/Estimator Pooled OLS Two-way Fixed 
Effects 
Between 
Estimator 
Primary Variables of Interest    
Median Income 0.0008 0.003 0.0004 
Tax Price (%) -1723.7 -6178.5*** -1605.7 
Environmental Covariates    
Stimulus Funding Per Capita 0.2 -0.03 1.06* 
Median Age 0.9 -5.9 1.1 
Population Density -0.005 -0.03 -0.0005 
Local Share of State-Local Expenditure 4.03* 2.2* 2.9 
Net Capital Stock Per Capita 0.01* 0.02 0.01* 
Median Age of Structures 1.0 5.6 0.4 
Political Ideology 0.2 0.3 -0.3 
Outstanding Debt Per Capita 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 
Low Credit Cities -18.3 30.4 -41.0 
2009 -11.2 8.7  
2012 -23.1 -52.2  
Constant -258.4 -122.3 -166.3 
Model Details    
R-squared 0.3 0.6 0.3 
# of observations 232 232 232 
 
Sensitivity Analysis: First Difference Estimator 
The simple first-difference estimator confirmed my primary estimates from the two-way 
fixed effects model. While median income again appears to have a statistically insignificant 
impact on capital spending, an increase in the increase the tax share of the median voter (tax 
price) by 0.001 percentage point produces a large decrease in the rate of change of capital 
spending per capita of $6.8. This result is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. 
This suggests as the rate of change tax price increases within a city across time, the rate of 
change of capital spending also increases. 
Local share of state-local capital expenditure again appears to produce statistically 
significant impacts on capital spending at the city level – even when we compare changes across 
time. As the change in local share of capital expenditure increases by one percentage point, the 
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change in capital spending per capita at the city level increases by approximately $4 on average, 
ceteris paribus. This estimate is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. Thus, not 
only does the activeness of a particular city affect its prioritization of capital spending across 
time, changes in these also affect the level of change in capital spending. 
While the estimates for the impact of a majority of the other environment variables on 
capital spending per capita were not statistically significant, political ideology did seem to have 
an impact on capital spending per capita when we consider changes across time. As a city leans 
more towards Democrat presidential candidates, it also starts increasing its capital spending per 
capita. More specifically, the estimates suggest that an increase of one percentage point in the 
increase in a city’s Democrat leanings increases the rate of change of capital spending by $4.04. 
This result is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. Further, a change in the 
increase in net capital stock per capita of $1 appears to lead to an increase of $0.04 in public 
capital spending per capita at the city level, on average, ceteris paribus. These results validate our 
results from the two-way fixed effects model, and are presented in table 4 in the appendix. 
Sensitivity Analysis: First-differenced with level independent variables 
The first-difference estimator with initial base values for dependent variables produced 
interesting results on a number of independent variables. The coefficient on tax price remains 
consistent with the one that I estimated earlier using the regular first-difference estimator. Same 
is the case for the differences local share of state-local capital expenditure and the differenced 
net capital stock per capita. However, I added an unemployment variable in this model to see 
how it reacts. While the other results remain robust, I found that unemployment also has a 
statistically significant impact on public capital spending at the 90% confidence level. For a 1 
percentage point increase in the change of the unemployment rate across time, the change in 
public capital spending per capita decreases by approximately $9. This is as was hypothesized, 
since we expect a city with higher levels of unemployment to have a lower ability to afford more 
capital and therefore, to spend less on infrastructure. 
Amongst the initial (level) variables, only initial levels of net capital stock per capita 
appears to have a statistically significant impact on the change in public capital spending per 
capita at the city level. If a city’s initial net capital stock per capita was higher by $1, the change 
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in public capital spending per capita in that city over time was negative and of the magnitude 
$0.02. Thus, higher infrastructure levels at the beginning of a period do appear to have a 
marginally negative impact on the rate of change of capital spending over time in a particular 
city. These results are illustrated in Table 5 of the appendix. 
Conclusion 
In this study, I analyzed a unique dataset using established econometric techniques in 
order to understand the determinants of capital spending at the municipal level. While there is a 
significant corpus of studies available on the links between infrastructure and economic growth, 
and on the determinants of capital spending at the state level, there are no significant studies in 
the public domain that look at the latter at the municipal level. Metropolitan areas are engines of 
economic growth in the United States. The rising importance of cities in the country as an arena 
for policymaking and public resource-creation and management is increasing the need for studies 
to focus on the heart of the metropolitan area. However, the challenge of undertaking such 
research is exacerbated by the dearth of consolidated data. Municipal level finances remain 
siloed at the city level, buried in the depths of individual annual financial reports. One of the 
most important lessons emerging from this study is that there is a dire need for all levels of 
government to fund the consolidation of this information. Without such a database, city level 
analyses will remain anecdotal, and any attempt at evidence-based policymaking at the state or 
federal level will be futile.  
While the results of this study are limited by a relatively low number of degrees of 
freedom and potential problems with lagged effects in the impact of certain variables on capital 
spending, some interesting findings emerge from it. Firstly, changes in median income do not 
seem to have a statistically significant impact on capital spending per capita. This runs counter to 
the intuition that as the income of the median voter increases, then so does the affordability of 
more capital spending and higher the demand for it. This could be the result of: a) a failure of the 
median voter demand model to hold in this case, since capital spending might not be a normal 
good or the median voter might not be the one winning the vote; b) the data might have 
insufficient variation with respect to median income; or c) other factors are the cause for changes 
in capital spending at the city level. However, while it is understandable that the demand for 
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capital spending would decrease due to a rise in the price of such spending (due to a rise in tax 
price), it is surprising to see how large of an impact this has on the demand for capital spending. 
Thus, city level financial managers should be wary of movements in the tax price when planning 
future capital spending decisions. 
It appears that the federal stimulus worked, in the sense that it stimulated capital spending 
at the city level across cities. This is an important finding and invalidates concerns over the 
fungibility of public capital spending at the local level in the context of the recession and the 
ensuing stimulus package. Further, I found that higher debt levels are highly correlated with 
higher spending levels. This might be a reflection of the prioritization of capital spending within 
cities, whereby, financial managers are ready to incur more debt with the hope that higher capital 
spending will leave to future economic gains and financial stability. Given that the local share of 
state-local capital spending appears to play a positive role in increasing public capital spending 
per capita and is robust across different models, I conclude that cities which are playing a more 
active role within their states, also demand more capital spending and are also willing to spend 
more on their infrastructure needs. 
Based on the analysis, I also show how the rate of change of municipal capital spending 
per capita changes when a city begins to lean more towards Democrat ideals. While this makes 
intuitive sense, given the respective stances of the Democrat Party and the GOP on the size and 
role of government (with the GOP preferring government contraction), it goes to show that 
politics have a major role to play in the financing decisions of the future and consequently, the 
economic health of the country.  
Way Forward 
While this study attempted to tackle some of the challenges of doing research on 
municipal finance from a cross-sectional, national perspective, it was limited by data and time 
constraints. Future studies should look at expanding the number of years in the dataset; 
improving model specifications by delving deeper into the lagged impacts of independent 
variables on capital spending per capita; analyzing potential differences between even the 
determinants of capital spending before and after the recession, not just the estimates of a 
common set of determinants; undertaking regional analyses to see if there is heterogeneity in 
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capital spending patterns across different regions in the United States; looking at the impact of 
varying demographics on capital spending at the local level; understanding the differential 
impact of the multiple varieties of capital spending; and undertaking case studies on municipal 
capital spending patterns.  
Precisely like the study, this list is not exhaustive. It is only meant to open up municipal 
capital spending to a more rigorous line of inquiry  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Units # of 
Observations 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Median Income USD ($) 259 45813.37 13738.11 24061.14 117606.7 
Tax Price Percentage 
(%) 
260 0.0021808 0.0048816 0.0000631 0.0403547 
Median Age Years 260 34.08885 3.033365 24.5 47.6 
Real GDP Per Capita USD ($) 260 45908.4 11886.24 24561 97200.82 
Unemployment Rate Percentage 
(%) 
243 7.126502 3.099898 2.2 24.8 
Local Share of State-Local 
Expenditure 
Percentage 
(%) 
260 63.23554 12.27838 33.62 100 
Population Units 260 4882.98 4718.877 171.2161 27486.64 
Outstanding Debt Per 
Capita 
USD ($) 260 908.509 1455.644 0 15034.93 
Total Revenue Per Capita USD ($) 239 2666.614 2696.216 1.807686 30856 
Capital Outlay Per Capita USD ($) 237 239.8922 259.9269 10.08616 2119.338 
Net Capital Stock Per Capita USD ($) 236 6559.325 3901.711 1225.974 28801.09 
Tax Per Capita USD ($) 237 1137.093 1627.54 154.7511 19788.82 
Political Ideology Percentage 
(%) 
257 13.14214 27.1034 -45.07 85.93 
Stimulus Funding Per Capita USD ($) 260 24.74175 83.49131 0 873.4563 
Median Age of Structures Years 260 46.06538 14.83525 13 75 
Low Credit Cities Units 260 0.1884615 0.3918345 0 1 
Medium Credit Cities Units 260 0.1923077 0.3948736 0 1 
High Credit Cities Units 260 0.6192308 0.4865125 0 1 
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Table 2: Details on Variables 
Dependent Variable 
Variable Name Description Data Source 
Capital outlay 
per capita 
The primary dependent variable that I used was capital outlay per 
capita at the city level. The capital outlay includes expenditure 
made through the general fund, the major fund as well as the non-
major capital projects fund at the city level. The capital outlay is the 
primary budget item that identifies the overall expenditure made on 
public infrastructure in a given year. 
CAFRs 
Independent Variables 
Variable Name Description Data 
Source 
Expected 
Impact 
Explanation 
Median income The median income represents the income earned by the median 
voter, as discussed earlier. The median income is given in dollars. 
United 
States 
Census 
Bureau 
 As the median income increases, 
I expect public capital spending 
to increase, since the public’s 
purchasing power increases, 
increasing demand for desired 
public capital expenditure. 
Real GDP per 
capita 
This represents the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 
at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). The idea here is that 
while this is not a city level variable, it captures the economic 
externalities produced by a central city in a metropolitan area, 
which might not be captured by just controlling for GDP per capita 
for the city’s residents. This makes intuitive sense given that 
suburbs and smaller towns depend on the primary city in the metro 
area for numerous economic functions, such as insurance, banking, 
finance and export. Further, many earners in the city prefer to live 
in the suburbs and in exurban areas, who remain unaccounted for 
with covariates such as city level income per capita data. 
Bureau of 
Economic 
Analysis 
 As real GDP per capita 
increases, the metro area gains in 
wealth, creating new potential 
that the city attempts to tap into 
by laying down more 
infrastructure through greater 
capital spending. 
Median age of 
structure 
This is a weak proxy for the quality of the infrastructure. The 
intuition here is that the older the infrastructure (median) the lower 
its current quality 
United 
States 
Census 
Bureau 
 The older (and lower quality) the 
infrastructure, the greater the 
capital spending per capita 
required to furnish and maintain 
it. 
Outstanding 
debt per capita 
This represents the city government’s general obligation (GO) 
bonds position. The city funds much of its capital spending using 
CAFRs  The higher the outstanding debt 
per capita, the lower capital 
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funds generated through the issuance of GO bonds. These are part 
of what are commonly known as municipal bonds and are part of a 
vibrant muni-bond market in the United States. The GO bond is 
secured by a city government’s pledge to use legally available 
resources, including tax revenues (many times property taxes) to 
repay bondholders. A city’s outstanding debt per capita represents 
its credit position, especially in the context of capital spending. 
spending, since higher 
indebtedness negatively affects a 
city’s availability to fund capital 
spending. However, this current 
increase in debt might fund 
current increase in capital 
spending. Past debt levels might 
affect capital spending 
negatively, however. 
Local Share of 
State-Local 
Capital 
Spending 
This variable holds data on the capital expenditures made at the 
local level as a percentage of capital spending across an entire state. 
Since data is not available at the city level, local shares are used for 
city shares. Further, because there is at times more than one city for 
a particular state, the local share in one city in a state remains the 
same for another city in the same state. However, this is a good 
proxy for the city’s share of state-city finances, since local shares 
do not have large movements across cities in a particular state. 
Census of 
Govts. 
 As the local share of state-local 
capital spending increases, I 
would expect public capital 
spending to increase as well, as 
cities play a larger role in 
infrastructure financing and in 
laying down the terms of their 
future economic growth. 
Credit ratings Standard & Poor’s (S&P) ratings of each city’s general obligation 
bonds. The variable ranges from a high of AAA to a low of BBB- 
for this particular dataset. No city had a credit rating worse than 
BBB-. The change in interest rates from moving up or down this 
scale is non-linear, implying that moving from say, AA+ to AAA 
does not lead to the same decrease in interest rate owed on GO 
bonds as does a movement from BBB- to BBB. Therefore, linear, 
discrete ranking on a numerical scale was not possible. Therefore, 
the nonlinear variations in interest rates were used to construct a 
new index. This is an environmental variable, providing insights 
into the broader financial health of the city. A higher credit rating 
provides a city to acquire GO bonds at lower interest rates. Further, 
a higher credit rating is also an indication of stability in the 
financial indicators of the city. 
CAFRs  A higher credit rating should 
lead to higher capital spending 
 
 
Population 
density 
Population density for a city in a particular year. This is an 
environmental covariate which controls for demographic 
characteristics of a city. 
United 
States 
Census 
Bureau and 
CAFRs 
 As population density increases, 
the pressure for spending on 
infrastructure for a city would 
also be expected to increase. 
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Median age The median age in a particular city for a specific year. This is an 
environmental covariate which controls for demographic 
characteristics of a city. 
United 
States 
Census 
Bureau 
 No clear hypothesis on median 
age, since it has both pulls and 
push factors on capital spending. 
As people age, their spending 
peaks. However, as people age 
further, they might be get more 
economically conservative, 
leading to a resistance to higher 
capital spending 
Unemployment 
rate 
The unemployment rate at the city level. This is an socioeconomic 
covariate, reflecting the state of the city’s economic wellbeing, 
level of inequality and distribution of jobs in the city’s economy. 
United 
States 
Census 
Bureau 
 As the unemployment rate 
increases, capital spending will 
decrease, controlling for stimulus 
funding that might be correlated 
with it. Higher unemployment 
makes public capital spending 
less affordable for the public. 
Political 
ideology 
This variable contains information on the gap between votes cast 
for Democrat presidential candidates as compared to Republican 
presidential candidates in the elections of 2004, 2008 and 2012. 
Thus, it aims to show how ‘Democrat’ a particular city is. Given 
the gradual polarization between the positions of the two political 
parties, apart from limited variation, it is argued that a city which 
votes for a Democrat member will be more amenable to a greater 
role of government. Data for 2004 is used for 2006, data for 2008 is 
used for 2009 and data for 2012 is used for 2012. Since political 
allegiance shows a certain amount of inertia, the flexible use of 
years should not be a major problem. Further, the data was 
collected at the county level. 
Dave Leip’s 
Atlas of US 
Presidential 
Elections 
(http://usele
ctionatlas.or
g/) 
 The more ‘Democrat’ a city, the 
higher the acceptability for the 
role of government and 
therefore, high the level of 
capital spending. 
Net capital 
assets per 
capita 
This variable provides data on public capital stock less 
depreciation. Net capital assets represent the overall capital stock 
that a city has at a particular point in time. The methodology for 
measuring capital stock is provided by the Governmental 
Accounting Standards Board (GASB) and is thus, standardized 
across cities. The capital stock however, is historically priced. This 
creates the problem of potential understatement of the capital stock 
for older cities as compared to newer ones. The same street would 
CAFRs  A larger level of net capital 
assets per capita would imply 
that the city would need lower 
levels of capital spending. 
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have cost less (in nominal terms) in the 1940s than it does in 2012. 
However, this threat to this variable does not create major hurdles 
for the analysis. The intuition here being that while older 
infrastructure has a lower price associated with it because of the 
lower nominal price, the lower level of the price also encapsulates 
the age of the infrastructure. However, it had to be assumed that 
local inflation is consistent across cities. 
ARRA Variable for incorporating stimulus, infrastructure data into the 
analysis. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) 
of 2009, also referred to as the Stimulus or the Recovery Act was 
an economic stimulus package enacted by the 111th United States 
Congress in February 2009 and signed into law on February 17, 
2009, by President Barack Obama. ARRA was introduced in 
response to the recession of 2008-09 in order to get the economy 
going again. This variable was controlled for because it had an 
impact on local level capital spending, by definition. The variable 
was created by extracting only data on stimulus infrastructure 
spending at the city level. 
Recovery.go
v 
 An increase in the federal 
stimulus spending on 
infrastructure should 
definitionally lead to higher 
capital spending 
Time dummies I used two time dummies (2009 and 2012) in OLS regressions and 
fixed effects models (explained later) and one time dummy (2009-
12) in the first differencing model. This allows us to see the impact 
that a particular year has on capital spending. Essentially, we 
control for time invariant common trends using time dummies. This 
also allows us to quantify the impact of a specific year, based on 
the generation of a new intercept for our regression estimate. 
Not 
Applicable 
 The year 2009 should have a 
statistically significant decrease 
on capital spending, controlling 
for ARRA 
City dummies Introduction of city dummies controls for time invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity across cities. We introduce 99 dummy 
variables in certain sensitivity analysis to see how capital spending 
varied across particular cities, controlling for other variables. 
Not 
Applicable 
 Not Applicable 
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Table 4: Results for First-Difference Estimator 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
FD_capitalo~y |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
FD_medianin~e |   .0006176     .00325     0.19   0.850    -.0058188     .007054 
FD_taxprice~t |  -6755.283   2863.202    -2.36   0.020     -12425.7   -1084.862 
      FD_arra |   .0446147   .0908035     0.49   0.624    -.1352169    .2244462 
 FD_medianage |  -2.828531   7.031555    -0.40   0.688    -16.75416     11.0971 
FD_populati~y |    .032064   .0371719     0.86   0.390     -.041553     .105681 
FD_localshare |   4.056754   1.526159     2.66   0.009     1.034277    7.079232 
     FD_ncspc |   .0373524   .0198374     1.88   0.062    -.0019345    .0766393 
FD_medstruc~e |   4.677825   6.361316     0.74   0.464    -7.920428    17.27608 
 FD_political |   3.631654   2.014106     1.80   0.074    -.3571768    7.620485 
      FD_debt |   .0516946   .0438212     1.18   0.241    -.0350909    .1384801 
 FD_unemprate |  -4.744725   5.085968    -0.93   0.353    -14.81722    5.327768 
        _cons |  -53.26002   36.23138    -1.47   0.144    -125.0144    18.49433 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 5: Results for First-Difference Estimator with Level Variables 
 
               _cons |  -50.66602   34.55011    -1.47   0.145    -119.0907    17.75867 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     129 
                                                       F( 22,   106) =    2.20 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0042 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2420 
                                                       Root MSE      =  174.02 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      |               Robust 
     FD_capitaloutlay |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      FD_medianincome |   .0022061   .0041886     0.53   0.600    -.0060982    .0105104 
   FD_taxpricepercent |   -6853.58   3774.614    -1.82   0.072    -14337.12      629.96 
              FD_arra |  -.0298311   .1200905    -0.25   0.804    -.2679222    .2082599 
         FD_medianage |   2.153562   8.754025     0.25   0.806    -15.20214    19.50927 
 FD_populationdensity |   .0545729   .0603147     0.90   0.368    -.0650069    .1741527 
        FD_localshare |   3.558748   1.418189     2.51   0.014     .7470497    6.370446 
             FD_ncspc |   .0739203   .0349406     2.12   0.037     .0046471    .1431935 
      FD_medstructage |   8.564791   6.870064     1.25   0.215    -5.055778    22.18536 
         FD_political |   2.435644   2.002755     1.22   0.227    -1.535014    6.406301 
              FD_debt |   .0489927   .0466843     1.05   0.296    -.0435635    .1415488 
         FD_unemprate |  -9.067783   5.374413    -1.69   0.095    -19.72308    1.587514 
     ini_medianincome |  -.0012155   .0012946    -0.94   0.350    -.0037822    .0013511 
  ini_taxpricepercent |  -1206.499   1174.279    -1.03   0.307    -3534.621    1121.623 
             ini_arra |  -.0053949   .1662621    -0.03   0.974    -.3350256    .3242359 
        ini_medianage |  -.6842231   5.610332    -0.12   0.903    -11.80725    10.43881 
ini_populationdensity |  -.0030481   .0071401    -0.43   0.670    -.0172041    .0111079 
       ini_localshare |   .3548841    1.49573     0.24   0.813    -2.610546    3.320314 
            ini_ncspc |  -.0174765   .0096901    -1.80   0.074     -.036688    .0017351 
     ini_medstructage |   1.465926    1.29076     1.14   0.259    -1.093132    4.024984 
        ini_political |   .4293025   .9894578     0.43   0.665    -1.532394    2.390999 
             ini_debt |   .0021451   .0130241     0.16   0.869    -.0236764    .0279667 
        ini_unemprate |  -7.439956   5.551009    -1.34   0.183    -18.44537    3.565459 
                _cons |   59.02049   188.5402     0.31   0.755    -314.7788    432.8198 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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